Lethal Weapon 4 – DivX Version (Normal Quality), iPod/iPhone Version
|
IMDB rating: 6.30 Plot: Martin Riggs and Roger Murtaugh, after escaping death from the previous movies are put on a hit list by The Triads. When blood thirsty mercenaries are on their tail they team up again with Leo Getz and Lorna Cole, a newcomer (Chris Rock) to finally put an end to the Triads for good. |
Available versions:
DivX Version (Normal Quality), iPod/iPhone Version
Actors: Li Jet,Gibson Mel,Kehler Jack,Pesci Joe,Rock Chris,Kahan Steve,Glover Danny,Chan Kim,Eddy Ko,Jung Calvin,Hines Damon,Action,Comedy,Crime,Thriller,
Petraeus Style Group-Think — Is There An Alternative?
The Fundamental proposition of Petraeus Style Group-Think is that: "It is necessary to fight a counter-insurgency war in Afghanistan to keep America safe from Al Qaida and to keep Pakistan safe from the Taliban."
Once Group-Think takes hold, a Group will produce decisions consistent with an IQ level that is 25% below the average IQ of the bottom quartile of that particular group.
The Petraeus Doctrine group includes 200 members, 150 from DOD, 30 from the White House, and 20 from the Congress. Overall the group is composed of extra-ordinarily smart people, but the bottom quartile of the group has an IQ average of only 110.
According to the group-think formula the Group’s IQ for decison making purposes is 82, which is a little above the clinical definition of a moron..
In a Group-Think situation, is is not at all necessary that a majority of the group be stupid people. If only 1/4 of the group has approximately average intelligence, the group as a whole will perform at the moron level (see also The Abilene Paradox).
General Petraeus’ "outside the wire" hearts and minds strategy is truly moronic in relation to the size and roughness of the terrain, and the U.S. experience in Vietnam, and in Iraq.
Are there any alternatives? Are we always going to be in this situation? Is there any possibility that America might ever get even a little bit smarter about how it manages its armed conflicts?
Please Note: I realize that Afghanistan at this point is more about killing the Taliban than about finding and killing Al Qaida. It is the Taliban that could possibly take over Pakistan and thus acquire an Islamist/Jihadist nuclear weapon. So killing lots of Taliban is key, not just pinpoint surgical strikes on Al Qaida leadership. But, I say all that can be done from "inside the wire" (Bagram Air Force Base). If the money weren’t all being poured into the Petraeus Strategy (hearts and minds), we would have the cash to upgrade the capabilities of NRO and NSA particularly in the traffic analysis aspect of target identification. With what we have at sea and at Bagram we could eliminate 90% of the Taliban in Afghanistan. The purpose of war is to be lethal to the enemy, not to be a target for the enemy. This was known before the Age of General Group-Think Petraeus.
For Shock and Awe: I start with the idea of staying inside the wire. For me, it’s about targeting. I’m not seeking to understand hearts and minds or to win them (Cambodia 1969 was there). I just want to know who they are and where they are and who is near them. So, the folks I need at Bagram are the Predator re-fuel and re-arm crews. I also need the A-10 crews, and AWACS types. I need a couple fo dozen CIA Black Ops people to ride in silentchoppers, land for 15 minutes and plant passive infra-red sensors, and listening devices. These people can be extracted in 30 seconds if anyone comes within 2000 yards. They are bug planters not warfighters. But, with no humint, and limited sigint, I need a bit more than pure overhead viewing. Targeting is costly, not just to get the data, but to analyse it right. Petraeus needs to be shut down so the money is available to wage lethal and American Taxpayer benefitting war. No more nationbuilding or infrastructure or social services. They keep hearts
For oldmanwi:
Non-combatants are never the enemy. Bite your tounge. As for killing all the enemy, yes, I’m for that — surround them, and kill them — that’s what war is about, not coddle them and protect them from each other and build schools, roads, wells and hospitals for them. Surround and kill and come home ASAP — that’s the mission. If DOD does not know who, or where or how, don’t start the mission. If there is no mission, don’t go out on one.
For Lt. Col. Jim (Ret.)
You are stuck in the CI mode. I have said Petraeus wrote the book on Counter Insurgency, and that CI is 100% the wrong way to go in Afghan, so Petraeus Theory money needs to be pulled and re-deployed to make an inside the wire strategy work. I’m against HUMINT, especially from local warlords. It always gets the wrong people killed and we get blamed. Tora Bora — local warlords "helped" us there too. They are liars who hate our guts. Getting an inside the wire strategy to work (including carrier assets), means thinking different, and learning new skills — not just same old same old. Computer assisted taffic analysis and hypothesis/verification models can be extremely powerful in finding the foe and lining up a clean shot. We need to kill all the Taliban. So Bagram and the Fleet will have it’s work cut out for it, also NSA and NRO — the new skills learners. Also we need bug planting skills — drops are OK but not for all types of PIR devices.
First off, where is the research that validates your IQ thesis? Secondly you seem to be a little simplistic (to be polite) about how strategy is made.) Thirdly, the US experience in Vietnam AND Iraq actually shows that active patrolling works. Apparently you need to read a little more on the success of CI in Vietnam where the VC was essentially eliminated in provinces where a "Petraeus strategy" was employed. Using "Vietnam" as a failed CI strategy is like condemning combined arms warfare because the Wehrmacht lost WW2. There’s more to the US failure in SE Asia-primarily not knowing what the specific goals were (THAT part is not unlike Obama’s strategy in Afghanistan.)
In Iraq, violence dropped precipitously; one of the reasons it faded from the CNN/Foxnews Infotainment Sphere.
AFA "traffic analysis", to quote Sec. Gates, "We’re DROWNING in data." We don’t have the folks to interpret it. HUMINT, not IMINT, COMINT or EO/IR imagery wins CI campaigns.
Finally McChrystal’s plan is NOT Petraeus’: McChrystal envisions a special-operations type of infil/UW again using the local warlords as HUMINT and ops resources. Iraq was nothing like this.
Don’t get me wrong- I think there’s validity in your assertions about the futility of growing democracy in a country that has an 80% illiteracy rate, no real economic infrastructure, and has NEVER had a sense of centralized gov’t. Essentially Afghanistan missed the Enlightenment..
EDIT and you sir, are stuck on Technology. There is TOO MUCH DATA,or didn’t you get that part? Airstrikes are killing more civilians than insurgents-that’s why they are restricted to essentially MQ9’s and in specific ROE. Dropping sensors? Where? What do you expect to pick up? Other than the occasional motorcycle, they’ve gone off the grid-they avoid Iridium and cellphone usage now.
CI, sorry that’s what this is, Taliban/Al Qaeda are nothing if not insurgents, bent on reestablishing a gov’t in Afghanistan. As for Tora Bora, apparently you didn’t read the whole story; that was a scew-up on the American side as the teams weren’t properly infil’d and supported-NOT due to anything the warlords did.
jim | Sep 05, 2009
Well for your information, things are different on the ground regardless of how many "eggheads" debate and think things through back here in the states. Once you go there and see, smell and live in the villages, meet the politicians/local authorities of their country, endure the living conditions and actually fight the Al Qadea, HIG and the Tailban, then you will see why General Petraeus’ "outside the wire" hearts and minds strategy is necessary to have. It was a major work in force in Iraq and it has helped stabilize a less primitive country.
Not everything on Bagram is made for fighting either. Most people there except for the aviators, are support folks who have no idea what happens in the mountains or plains. This I know from first knowledge and researching the facts. Now, we do need to step up our intel capabilities and conduct some surgical strikes on terrorist heads and freeze their "cash flow." We need to deny them the support of the locals in Pakistan and Afghanistan too. We tried it in Vietnam, it has worked in most areas of Iraq and needs to be implemented pronto.
Just my thoughts and good question/observation.
Shock and Awe | Sep 05, 2009
There are always alternatives. One that comes to mind
is that ideas which serve to rationalize the decisions made
in the waging of war are always after the fact. The decision is
made quickly followed by the rationale. So, we could simply
decide to wage war and offer no explanations as to why we
wage it and how we wage it. The Marine Corps has an under-
standing of this. General’s do not. Counter insurgency is a
losing proposition. A conventional ground war is lost before
it is waged if the arena is in the enemies own back yard.
The British learned this in America in the revolutionary war
and in the war of 1812. Napoleon learned it in Russia. The
U.S. learned it in Korea and in Viet Nam.
Success in war is achieved only if the purpose is total
annihilation of the enemy. This means all of the enemy.
Combatants as well as non-combatants.
oldmanwithcoyote | Sep 05, 2009
This entry was posted
on Sunday, November 15th, 2009 at 10:43 am and is filed under Uncategorized.
You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed.
You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.